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Abstract: Since Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, analysts have 
puzzled over how best to define his political trajectory. Is he consoli-
dating power and building a personality cult around himself, or is he 
strengthening the Party as an organisation? I tackle this issue by focus-
ing on the transformation of personnel policies under Xi. I highlight 
an increasing concentration of power in the hands of Party leaders at 
all echelons. At the institutional level, the Party increasingly controls 
the management and disciplining of officials. At the level of the indi-
vidual cadres themselves, promotion processes are increasingly man-
aged behind closed doors and less importance is being given to objec-
tive criteria for cadre advancement. The age-based rules which struc-
tured the promotion of officials and ensured a high level of personnel 
turnover within the party state are also de-emphasised. I argue that 
these changes are paving the way for a more clientelist and aging 
party state. 
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Has Xi Jinping been consolidating his own power at the expense of 
the Party? Since Xi became the General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in late 2012, a series of events appear to 
point in the direction of an increased personalisation of power. After 
Xi was designated the “core” (Ṩᗳ, hexin) of the central leadership at 
the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee in October 
2016 (Xinhua 2016a), “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era” (Ґ䘁ᒣᯠᰦԓѝഭ⢩㢢⽮Պѫѹᙍᜣ, 
Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang) was added to the 
CCP charter at the 19th Party Congress of October 2017 (Xinhua 
2017a). Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor, failed to receive this symbolic 
denomination as core despite his 10 years of leadership. Besides that, 
Xi has seen his “thought” elevated to the Party’s guiding ideology 
after only one term in office. His predecessors Hu and Jiang Zemin 
had to wait until retirement for their theoretical contributions to be 
given such status. Beyond these symbolic acknowledgments of Xi’s 
power, it is the removal from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
constitution of the two-term limit for the Office of President that has 
attracted the most attention – as Xi now has no legal restriction on 
remaining president after 2022. This change appears to be a clear sign 
of Xi’s challenge to the process of institutionalising Chinese politics 
that first started in the 1980s (Shirk 2018; Guerguiev 2018).  
Although most observers agree that Xi is challenging the status 
quo, there is wide disagreement on the implications of the institution-
al changes that he has put forward. For some, the current changes 
amount to a new phase of centralisation of the party-state apparatus, 
aiming at greater efficiency (Kostka and Nahm 2017). Before the 
lifting of the presidential term limit, some scholars would go even 
further, describing Xi’s centralisation of power as the first step in a 
profound reform of the system towards greater institutionalisation 
(Wang and Zeng 2016). Conversely, the lifting of the term limit – an 
institutional mechanism described as a pillar of Chinese elite politics’ 
relative stability since the 1980s (Ma 2016) – provides fresh support 
for those arguing that Xi’s reforms aim at a simple personalisation of 
power, at the expense of the Party (Shirk 2018). Finally, they are others 
who try to find a middle way, refusing to see the relationship between 
Xi’s personal power and the Party’s organisational strength as a zero-
sum game (Guerguiev 2018). 
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The article engages with this debate by focusing on the trans-
formation of the Party’s personnel policies under Xi, and specifically 
on the mechanisms governing the recruitment and promotion of 
leading cadres. It aims to provide a systematic analysis of the recent 
evolution of personnel politics to see how it fits with the personalisa-
tion of power narrative. Such an organisational approach also allows 
for evaluating the changes made under Xi in light of previous per-
sonnel policies.  
A careful analysis of critical documents tied to cadre manage-
ment issued by the CCP since Xi took power highlights a trend to-
wards the increased concentration of power. Contrary to a pure cen-
tralisation of power, the increased concentration thereof in Xi’s own 
hands goes together with the strengthening of Party leaders’ positions 
at every echelon of the party state. At the organisational level, recent 
reforms have expanded the Party’s reach in terms of personnel man-
agement and discipline. At the level of individual cadres, Xi is both 
putting pressure on leading officials through the Party’s disciplinary 
apparatus and giving them more agency in personnel recruitment and 
promotion. To do so, Xi is dismantling the mechanisms aimed at 
increasing transparency in the promotion process that had been put 
forward under Hu, as well as downplaying the importance of age as a 
criterion for promotion. This carrot-and-stick strategy gives more 
weight to the leader’s subjectivity, and is being reproduced at every 
level of the party-state apparatus.  
After reviewing the existing literature on the progressive institu-
tionalisation of the CCP’s cadre system, I unveil the reforms strength-
ening the position of the Party apparatus in personnel management 
and discipline. Finally, I detail critical changes to the personnel sys-
tem occurring under Xi, which challenge both intra-Party democracy 
(ފ޵≁ѫ, dangnei minzhu) mechanisms and elite turnover. I argue that 
these changes strengthen the party state’s clientelist features and will 
limit that elite turnover. 
7KH,QVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIWKH&DGUH
0DQDJHPHQW6\VWHPDQG,WV/LPLWV
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese cadre corps 
gradually became an organised bureaucracy with a structured ranking 
and wage system. First steps towards the institutionalisation of bur-
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eaucratic rules were observable at the local level starting from the 
1950s. Oksenberg (1968) has shown that, during what he called the 
bureaucratic phases of Mao Zedong’s era – which took place in be-
tween major political campaigns, such as the anti-rightist campaign 
(1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), or the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966–1976) – political recruitment grew more codified and edu-
cational background became a more critical selection criterion relative 
to class background. In the 1960s, Vogel (1967) examined the regu-
larisation of commonly understood standards to evaluate and train 
cadres. Barnett (1967: 45) argued that in the late 1960s, China’s cadre 
management practices had developed into a system in which per-
formance was more important than interpersonal factors in determin-
ing career advancement. This initial phase of institutionalisation 
ceased with the onset of the Cultural Revolution. 
After Mao’s death in 1976 and the reforms that followed, a 
whole branch of literature emerged on the renewed institutionalisa-
tion of cadre recruitment in China (Lee 1991). It demonstrated how, 
starting in 1980 with Deng Xiaoping’s call for a four-way transform-
ation, the cadre corps was reformed through the promotion of indi-
viduals who were “revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more 
technically specialised” (Deng 2014: 326). The CCP stopped relying 
on class background as a criterion for political selection, and devel-
oped new rules in the 1980s regarding cadres’ recruitment, training, 
and promotion. Education now became a key criterion herein (Lee 
1991).  
The new retirement regulations were instrumental in transform-
ing the regime’s elite. It was the end of the life-tenure system 
(Manion 1993). Moreover, from ministerial positions downwards, 
new rules regarding age limits were promulgated in the 1980s for 
every cadre rank (Kou and Zang 2014). Parallel to these written regu-
lations, unwritten norms were gradually established to force the re-
tirement of national Party leaders. At the 15th Party Congress in 
1997, an unwritten age limit of 70 was first applied to the election of 
Politburo members (Kou and Zang 2014). Beyond age-related regula-
tions, other emerging rules regarding term limits and progressive 
promotions also led to a more stable and predictable promotion sys-
tem for officials (Kou and Zang 2014).  
Related to these changes, a debate emerged in the 1980s about 
the relative role of the Party and the state in cadre management. In 
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1980 Deng Xiaoping voiced his dissatisfaction with the rigid person-
nel management system and underscored that the role played by the 
Party should be redefined (Chan 2016). Both Deng and Zhao Ziyang 
pushed, then, from 1986 onwards for separating the Party and the 
state when it comes to personnel. This emphasis led to the establish-
ment of the Ministry of Personnel in 1988, a new body to take re-
sponsibility for the management of cadres working in central gov-
ernment organs, service units, and public enterprises (Burns 1994). 
The suggested reforms, however, never went as far as proposed by 
Zhao and would stall after his eventual fall from power and the polit-
ical repression of 1989 (Chan 2016).  
While the separation of the Party and the state was never imple-
mented (Brødsgaard 2018), starting from the 1990s their respective 
responsibilities were clarified with the structuring of a civil service 
system. In addition to the establishment of a decentralised structure 
of civil service examinations, one of the most important develop-
ments of the new civil service system established in 1993 was the 
separation between the management of leading cadres (亶ሬᒢ䜘 , 
lingdao ganbu) and that of non-leading ones (䶎亶ሬᒢ䜘 , feilingdao 
ganbu) (Edin 2003). Leading cadres are the highest-ranked party-state 
figures at every level of the polity and within public sector units. The 
distinction between leading and non-leading cadre takes form within 
a structured hierarchy, with the ranks determining salaries and bene-
fits. Leading cadre ranks start at the section leadership level (、㓗, 
keji) – the equivalent of a township leader or a department director in 
a county-level government, and go all the way up to the state leader-
ship level (ഭ㓗, guoji) (Edin 2003). While official party-state statistics 
generally refer to leading cadres starting from the division director 
level (༴㓗, chuji), a recent article has estimated the overall number of 
such individuals at about two million (Chan and Gao 2018). The 
leading cadres are held responsible for, and evaluated on, the per-
formance of their unit. They are managed through the nomenklatura 
system under the control of the Party’s Organisation Department, 
while state organs manage non-leading cadres (Edin 2003). The Par-
ty’s control over leading positions was formalised into law in 2005 
with the drafting of the “Civil Service Law” (Chan 2016). 
Before Xi’s rise to power, it was hence widely accepted that the 
CCP had over a prolonged period of time developed clear structures 
and mechanisms to recruit, supervise, and promote its officials. Still, 
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scholars have debated the system’s degree of institutionalisation and 
meritocracy. The literature has stressed the development of precise 
guidelines to evaluate local cadres based on specific performance 
criteria (Heberer and Trappel 2013; Edin 2003). Some scholars went 
even further, and described the Chinese political system as approach-
ing a “political meritocracy” (Bell 2018). However, only mixed empir-
ical evidence accounts for a positive effect of work performance on 
the promotion of officials. Several studies highlight relationships as 
being more crucial than work performance (Landry, Lü, and Duan 
2018; Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012). Other scholars have argued that 
cadre management is only partially formalised, and that this is increas-
ingly visible under Xi (Fewsmith and Nathan 2019). There has, how-
ever, been no systematic study to date of the evolution of the cadre 
management system since 2012. 
To study the changes, then, in cadre management under Xi I 
choose to focus on key documents issued by the Central Party appar-
atus:  
First, I analyse the “Plan to Deepen Reform of Party and State 
Institutions” (hereafter, Plan to Deepen Reform) released in March 
2018. This document was adopted at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 
19th CCP Central Committee, and then approved by the National 
People’s Congress (NPC). It lays out a comprehensive plan for the 
transformation of both Party and state structures. While the official 
goal is to modernise further and render bureaucracy more efficient, I 
highlight how it strengthens the role played by the Party in personnel 
matters (CC of the CCP 2018).  
Second, I focus on the main Party document regarding the man-
agement of leading officials: “Work Regulations for the Promotion 
and Appointment of Leading Party and Government Cadres” (here-
after, Work Regulations). These regulations apply to all levels of the 
party-state structures, as well as Party leading cadres in the People’s 
Liberation Army, state-owned enterprises, and other social organisa-
tions. When the initial version came out in 1995, it was described as 
the first complete and systematic document on the management of 
leading officials (CC of the CCP 1995). This document was since 
revised several times, in 2002, 2014, and again in March 2019 (CC of 
the CCP 2019a). Comparing the different versions reveals the chang-
ing trends in the recruitment and promotion of leading officials. 
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In line with previous studies focusing on the evolution of the 
party-state personnel management system through official documents 
(Manion 1985; Burns 1994; Chan 2016), a detailed analysis of these 
two regulations allows a deeper understanding of the institutional 
changes promoted under Xi. While this approach leaves open the 
question of their implementation, it does give us a sense of the direc-
tion of change and of the party state’s view regarding personnel is-
sues. Such an organisational perspective also allows for a more trans-
parent and systematic study of the transformation of Chinese elite 
politics than the “pekinological” approach – which analyses fluxes in 
power based on the supposed personal relationships between top 
officials, and which remains mostly speculative (Li 2016). 
7KH3DUW\0DQDJHVDQG'LVFLSOLQHV&DGUHV
While the separation of the Party and the state was never fully im-
plemented vis-à-vis personnel management, it remained the official 
line throughout the reform era and formed an essential background 
to the introduction of the civil service system in 1993 (Brødsgaard 
2018). This is now changing under Xi. In March 2017 Wang Qishan, 
then secretary of the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection, publicly challenged the notion of a separation between Par-
ty and state, talking instead of a “division of labour” (ފ᭯࠶ᐕ, dang-
zheng fengong) (Lianhe Zaobao 2017). The Plan to Deepen Reform clari-
fied this new approach, including when it comes to cadre manage-
ment. It called for the “strengthening of the Party’s centralised and 
unified leadership over the civil servant ranks” (࣐ᕪފሩޜ࣑ઈ䱏Խ
Ⲵ䳶ѝ㔏а亶ሬ, jiaqiang gongwuyuan duiwu de jizhong tongyi lingdao).  
In practical terms, the Plan to Deepen Reform includes the ab-
sorption of the State Administration for Public Service by the Party’s 
Central Organisation Department (CC of the CCP 2018). This state 
agency was, up until this reform’s enactment, part of the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security and was in charge of managing 
civil servants – now 10 million in number (Xue and Chen 2018). It 
will henceforth exist only in name, for public relations purposes. The 
Organisation Department is also to exert direct control over the State 
Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, which is in charge of 
allocating personnel and organisational resources (CC of the CCP 
2018). These changes not only affect personnel management, as the 
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Plan to Deepen Reform details the further strengthening of the Party 
over the state in other policy areas – such as propaganda work or the 
management of religious affairs (CC of the CCP 2018). 
These changes do not directly contradict previous practices, either. 
The Party has always played a key role in personnel management and 
supervised the state structures in charge of human resources 
(Brødsgaard 2018). In contrast to its previous focus on the manage-
ment of leading cadres, however, these institutional changes put the 
Party in direct charge of all personnel management and human re-
source allocations, including regarding non-Party members too. 
A similar trend emerges when it comes to punishing party-state 
officials, as the disciplining campaigns launched by Xi have effectively 
expanded the Party’s power over these individuals. In the spring of 
2013, Xi initiated a massive anti-corruption campaign: some 
1,537,000 party-state cadres were disciplined, within the Party or 
through the courts, between the 18th and the 19th Party Congresses 
(2012–2017) (Li 2018). This campaign is overseen by the Party’s Cen-
tral Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC). Beyond sheer 
numbers, Xi’s campaign is exceptional as it targets not only low- and 
mid-level officials but also high-ranking “tigers.” At the end of 2017, 
440 cadres above deputy ministerial level had been punished (Li 
2018). Overall, Xi used this campaign as a strategic tool for dismant-
ling competing networks (Fu 2014); several of the disgraced officials 
were, in fact, accused of organising themselves against the incumbent 
(Bloomberg 2014).  
In June 2013, and parallel to the anti-corruption campaign, Xi 
launched a new “Mass Line Education and Practice Campaign” (㗔Շ
䐟㓯ᮉ㛢ᇎ䐥⍫ࣘ, qunzhong luxian jiaoyu shijian huodong) (CC of the 
CCP 2013). Officially, the campaign’s primary goals were to make the 
government more accessible to the public and to eradicate “the four 
[bad] work styles” (ഋ仾, sifeng): formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, 
and extravagance (Xinhua 2013). The Mass Line Campaign went hand 
in hand with Xi’s anti-corruption drive and his efforts to strengthen 
the CCP. The former provided the ideological background, as well as 
information to fuel the latter.  
One of the critical enforcement tools of the Mass Line Cam-
paign took the form of regular self-criticism sessions, called “demo-
cratic life meetings” (≁ѫ⭏⍫Պ, minzhu shenghuo hui) across all party-
state units. The democratic life meetings did not stop with the end of 
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the campaign in 2015, and have since been formalised as a disciplin-
ary procedure by the “Guidelines on Intra-Party Life in the New 
Situation” (CC of the CCP 2016). These democratic life meetings are 
regularly organised by the CCP committees at each level, and over-
seen by the Party’s disciplinary apparatus. At the central level, Polit-
buro members must attend such meetings at least once a year. During 
these officials are encouraged to come forward and atone for bad 
behaviour, as well as to denounce their colleagues’ failings (CC of the 
CCP 2016).  
Rather than decreasing in force after a few years, as often hap-
pens with Party campaigns, this disciplinary drive has in fact intensi-
fied and been further institutionalised. In 2017 investigations instigat-
ed by the Party continued to rise, with a 27 per cent increase in num-
ber as compared to the previous year (Wedeman 2018). To pursue 
anti-graft efforts further, starting from the end of 2016 new struc-
tures have been set up. In November 2016, a new Central Leading 
Group for Deepening the Reform of the Supervision System was 
established. This new body’s role is to organise the establishment of a 
network of supervision commissions throughout China (Xinhua 
2016b). At the same time, the NPC approved a constitutional 
amendment creating a National Supervision Commission (NSC) and 
adopted a “Supervision Law” detailing its operations (NPC 2018).  
The NSC oversees local commissions, established at the provin-
cial, city, and county levels. This reform integrates within the respec-
tive supervision commissions the various departments already dealing 
with supervision and corruption prevention, and in particular ele-
ments of the State Ministry of Supervision, of the CDIC, and of the 
Procuratorate. Although the State Ministry of Supervision and the 
Party Discipline and Inspection Commission have, in practice, been 
merged since 1993, this new Commission formalises this unification 
and includes the judicial authority of the Procuratorate. The NSC and 
its local versions have, therefore, supervisory power over all public 
sector personnel (Wedeman 2018).  
Beyond administrative streamlining, the Plan to Deepen Reform 
makes clear that the new NSC will share offices, organisational struc-
ture, and personnel with the CDIC. They are supposed to operate as 
one institution with two different names (CC of the CCP 2018). Be-
sides that, Yang Xiaodu, head of the NSC, is also deputy director of 
the CDIC, thus illustrating the hierarchical inferiority of the new 
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commission in comparison with the Party structure (Horsley 2018). 
Overall, while the plan for a new supervisory body offered the possi-
bility of a formalised disciplinary mechanism external to the Party, the 
new commission is mainly a way for the CDIC to extend its reach 
beyond Party members – to the whole public sector.  
The changes initiated under Xi have therefore further strength-
ened and structured the Party’s control over the management and 
disciplining of all party-state officials – beyond leading cadres, and 
beyond Party members too. This is being done at the expense of the 
supervisory power of the state. This does not, however, equal a cen-
tralisation of power in Xi’s hands pure and simple. While they are 
under increased scrutiny, local Party leaders are indeed also granted 
more discretion in the evaluation, promotion, and recruitment of 
their subordinates.  
7KH6XEMHFWLYH3RZHURIWKH³1XPEHU2QH´
Local Party leaders, the “number one” (аᢺ᡻, yi ba shou), have al-
ways been the key players in terms of recruitment. These decisions 
may be collective in theory, but they are also highly hierarchical – 
with the Party secretary at the relevant level having the final say (Edin 
2003; Zeng 2015). Recent changes in the recruitment and promotion 
of officials now give Party leaders even more leeway in personnel 
matters. The Work Regulations were revised twice under Xi, in 2014 
and 2019 (CC of the CCP 2019a). These successive changes highlight 
how the system of cadre management is being altered.   
Most importantly, the new regulations modify the evaluation sys-
tem for leading officials. Since the 1990s the party state has devel-
oped an evaluation system based on specific performance criteria, 
especially for leading cadres who are held responsible for that of their 
unit. Statistical assessments of performance are a crucial part of this 
evaluation. The gross domestic product growth of a locality, for ex-
ample, is essential in evaluating the performance of local party-state 
leaders (Heberer and Trappel 2013). This approach was challenged 
under Hu, and the evaluation system became more complex; cadre 
evaluation metrics became less focused on economic growth (Zuo 
2015). The 2014 version of the Work Regulations mirrored these 
evolutions, updating the 2002 one. In addition to existing indicators 
regarding social stability, economic development, and environmental 
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impact, new ones have been developed – including the level of em-
ployment, public income, technological innovation, education, health-
care, and social security (CC of the CCP 2014). These changes were a 
response to various issues experienced by the party state when meas-
uring performance, as well as to the problem of statistical manipula-
tion or “gaming” (Gao 2015).  
The April 2019 version sets forth changes insisting on cadres’ 
moral and political correctness. It introduces a “political standard”  
(᭯⋫ḷ߶, zhengzhi biaozhun) as the most important criterion for evalu-
ation. Although it still states that a cadre’s performance evaluation 
should not be based merely on economic growth, it does not go into 
much detail regarding the other criteria to be taken into account. 
Instead, it mentions that cadres must be evaluated in light of their 
contribution to “economic construction, political construction, cul-
tural construction, social construction, construction of an ecological 
civilisation, Party construction, and so on” (㓿⍾ᔪ䇮ǃ᭯⋫ᔪ䇮ǃ᮷
ॆᔪ䇮ǃ⽮Պᔪ䇮ǃ⭏ᘱ᮷᰾ᔪ䇮઼ފⲴᔪ䇮ㅹ, Jingji jianshe, zheng-
zhi jianshe, wenhua jianshe, shehui jianshe, shengtai wenming jianshe he dang de 
jianshe deng). These vague terms leave much leeway to local leaders to 
decide what to focus on when evaluating their subordinates. The 
most recent version of the Work Regulations confirmed these chang-
es (CC of the CCP 2019b). 
Second, intra-Party democracy procedures introduced in the first 
decade of the new century to make the promotion process more 
transparent are now being dismantled. After 2002, the first necessary 
step when selecting a cadre for promotion had been “democratic 
recommendation” (≁ѫ᧘㦀, minzhu tuijian). This recommendation 
procedure plays a gatekeeper role, so as to select through a supposed-
ly transparent process those qualified to go to the next stages (Zeng 
2015). The procedure was revised in 2014. From being “the most 
important basis” (䟽㾱׍ᦞѻа, zhongyao yiju zhiyi) in candidate selec-
tion, the results of the recommendation process became defined as 
only an “important reference” (䟽㾱৲㘳, zhongyao cankao) (CC of the 
CCP 2002, 2014). The 2019 iteration further decreases the im-
portance of democratic recommendations in the recruitment process. 
While until then appointments of leading officials “had to” (ᗵ享, 
bixu) go through this process, they now only “should” (ᓄᖃ, yingdang) 
(CC of the CCP 2014, 2019a). 
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In more practical terms, by contrast with the system developed 
in 2002 – which implied recommendation through a secret vote – the 
2014 Work Regulations mark a shift to oral recommendations instead 
(CC of the CCP 2002, 2014). This change was justified by the fact 
that officials sometimes treated “recommendation votes” (᧘㦀⾘, 
tuijian piao) as “elective votes” (䘹Ѯ⾘, xuanju piao), overlooking the 
fact that they were only supposed to inform the decision (CC of the 
CCP 2014). The 2019 iteration goes one step further in dismantling 
this process, as recommendation meetings are not the primary medi-
um anymore and can be replaced by “recommendation though dis-
cussion and investigation” (䈸䈍䈳⹄᧘㦀, tanhua diaoyan tuijian) con-
ducted individually. These changes are pushed forwards in the name 
of efficiency, but in practice make the recommendation process less 
and less transparent and at the mercy of individual discretion. 
The new practices were already used for the selection of the new 
central party-state leadership in preparation for the 19th Party Con-
gress. The selection process was conducted through face-to-face con-
sultations rather than an internal election, as had been the case for the 
last two such congresses. According to an official description, Xi met 
personally with 59 senior and retired party-state leaders to seek their 
input and advice on the final personnel decisions. Other members of 
the outgoing Politburo Standing Committee also held similar meet-
ings, and in total 290 ministerial-level cadres and senior military offi-
cers were consulted. According to the official account, the choice 
made in favour of informal recommendations over a formal vote was 
motivated by the malpractices linked with such elections (Xinhua 
2017b). Both the 2007 and 2012 congresses saw “voting based on 
personal connections” (ޣ㌫⾘, guanxipiao) or on “personal affinity”  
(Ӫᛵ⾘, renqingpiao). According to official reports, purged party-state 
leaders Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengcai, and Ling Jihua had engaged 
in “vote buying” (䍯䘹, huixuan) and “campaigning” (᣹⾘, lapiao) 
(Xinhua 2017b). Although such practices have been a significant 
concern for the party state regarding the democratic recommendation 
process (Zeng 2015), the new mechanism strengthens the system in 
which the Party secretary decides – almost unilaterally – who will take 
up a position, without even pretending to make the process transpar-
ent. 
The democratic recommendation procedure introduced in 2002 
aimed, as noted, at greater transparency in the recruitment process. It 
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far from guaranteed that though, as officials could game the system, 
and the local Party secretary remained the chief gatekeeper (Zeng 
2015). Still, it introduced some procedures which limited – at least 
partially – the leaders’ actions. By giving more leeway to local Party 
leaders in recruitment and evaluations procedures, the new develop-
ments tend to strengthen the clientelist features of the party-state 
cadre management system. They echo a recent survey among Chinese 
officials showing that the recognition of superiors is the most essen-
tial criterion for promotion, before competence or achievements (Li 
and Gore 2018). In addition to strengthening clientelism, the new 
regulations limit the pathways for young officials to rise through the 
ranks. Hiring practices for Party officials, which have enabled the 
party state to renew its elite continuously since the 1980s, are now 
being radically challenged. 
/LPLWHG$YHQXHVIRU(OLWH5HQHZDO
The formalisation of promotion mechanisms for officials in the 
1980s raised the issue of cadre renewal. Deng himself argued in 1980 
that  
we cannot confine cadre promotions to the current system of 
step-by-step promotion of Party and state cadres from the district 
level, to the county level, to the prefectural level, to the provincial 
level in that order […]. We must really promote outstanding 
young and middle-aged cadres, promote them quickly. (Manion 
1985: 232)  
The strict ranking and step-by-step promotion system made it very 
difficult for young officials to reach high-level positions. In order to 
solve this issue and promote elite renewal, channels for rapid promo-
tion were formalised (Kou and Tsai 2014). The changes led to a dual-
track promotion system, with some individuals being selected for 
leading positions early on and promoted quickly through a variety of 
institutional fast-track channels, while the majority would continue to 
follow the slower progressive promotion process (Pang, Keng, and 
Zhong 2018).  
In contrast to previous practices, and officially to avoid the pro-
motion of the unfit and inexperienced, the Party now tries to limit 
“exceptional promotions” (⹤Ṭᨀᤄ, poge tiba) (referring to the rise 
through the ranks of a young cadre who has not followed a step-by-
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step promotion process). While in the first decade of the new century 
exceptions to the progressive promotion rules could be made for 
“particularly exceptional young officials” (⢩࡛Ո⿰, tebie youxiu) (CC 
of the CCP 2002), the process is now more restricted. The 2014 
Work Regulations invite officials to “strictly control” (Ӿѕᦼᨑ , 
congyan zhangwo) such exceptional promotions, an evolution reaffirmed 
in the 2019 version. Such promotions are also now prohibited if the 
officials in question did not spend at least one year in their previous 
post. Also, they cannot be promoted by more than one rank at a time 
(CC of the CCP 2014, 2019a).  
As a result of the outlined changes, avenues for rapid promotion – 
the “open selection” (ޜᔰ䘹ᤄ , gongkai xuanba) and “competitive 
appointment” (ㄎҹк዇, jingzheng shanggang) mechanisms – have now 
been largely dismantled. The 2002 version of the Work Regulations 
included a whole section on these mechanisms. Competitive ap-
pointment refers to the process of selecting among candidates intern-
al to the recruitment administration, while open selection denotes the 
recruitment of external ones. The latter can come from another ad-
ministration or locality. They both require the Party to make a public 
announcement for vacant positions, open a procedure for all candi-
dates who fulfil the necessary conditions to submit job applications, 
and to select individuals through written exams and through inter-
views (CC of the CCP 2002). The idea behind the development of 
these mechanisms was to make recruitment more transparent as well 
as to bring new blood into the leadership ranks. In practice, these 
procedures made it easier for young officials to skip ranks in a very 
hierarchical system; the open selection process in particular became a 
well-known fast-track channel for young officials to get ahead in the 
Party (Kou and Tsai 2014).  
The scope for open selection has, however, been restricted since 
2014. It can now only be used when the local party-state unit is un-
able to find suitable candidates internally. Besides that, the 2014 
Work Regulations also insist that recruitment is to be done based on 
an overall vision of the candidate’s performance and not only on the 
grades that they obtained during the exam and interview (CC of the 
CCP 2014). The decreasing importance of open selection and com-
petitive appointment becomes even more apparent with the 2019 
Work Regulations. While in 2014 these mechanisms were still de-
scribed as the “main method of appointing leading officials” (亶ሬᒢ
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䜘䘹ᤄԫ⭘Ⲵᯩᔿѻа, lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong de fangshi zhi yi) 
(CC of the CCP 2014), as of the latest version it is now “one method 
to generate candidates” (ӗ⭏Ӫ䘹Ⲵа⿽ᯩᔿ, chansheng renxuan de yi 
zhong fangshi) – and not for appointments per se (CC of the CCP 
2019a). Open selection can only be used if the recruiting unit has no 
qualified candidate to offer, and competitive appointment is only an 
option to generate a first round of selection if the recruiting unit has a 
surplus of qualified candidates. These mechanisms should also be 
used for recruitment to deputy positions rather than full-ranked lead-
ing ones (CC of the CCP 2019a). 
To symbolise the decreasing importance of the open selection 
and competitive appointment procedures, the 2019 Work Regulations 
no longer include a dedicated section thereon (CC of the CCP 
2019a). In contrast to previous versions of the document, they now 
no longer provide details on how to operationalise these procedures – 
by setting out, for example, whether they should include interviews, 
written exams, or similar. As a result, unit leaders have gained signifi-
cant leeway in deciding whether to use these procedures or not – and 
in choosing what form they should take.  
Mirroring the discussion on democratic recommendations, these 
changes have officially been made to limit nepotism and other abuses. 
Some officials had used these methods to rapidly promote their affili-
ates, and designed job criteria so precisely that only the official they 
were aiming to recruit would match them (CC of the CCP 2014, 
2019a). However, these changes lead to less transparency and more 
leeway for local Party leaders to recruit whomever they want. Beyond 
the issue of transparency and the formality of the recruitment pro-
cess, these avenues which allowed young officials to rise quickly 
through the ranks within the party state are now far more restricted, 
limiting elite renewal.  
At the same time, previous regulations aiming at Party rejuvena-
tion by limiting the maximum age of officials are being eroded. Rules 
thereon for leading cadres were first developed, starting in the 1980s 
under Deng, in order to accelerate the rejuvenation of the cadre 
corps. They affect promotions at every level of the Chinese polity 
(Kou and Tsai 2014). These rules allow for regular turnover within 
the party-state hierarchy, which is largely seen as one of the features 
explaining the system’s resilience (Nathan 2003). Xi is progressively 
rolling back this age-based system, however. A document on how to 
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implement the recruitment of leading officials during the 2014–2018 
period notes that age limits should not be “imposed uniformly” (а࠰
࠷, yi dao qie) when it comes to promotions and transfers (Central 
Office of the CCP 2014). Similar language was also used regarding 
the selection of CC members in the run-up to the 19th Party Con-
gress (Xinhua 2017b). Xi additionally raised the issue of age rules and 
the promotion of the inexperienced at a meeting he chaired in July 
2018 regarding young party-state officials (Xinhua 2018).  
Officially, these changes are being undertaken so as to constrain 
the rapid promotion of inexperienced and unfit cadres relying on 
personal ties to accelerate their career (China Youth Daily 2014). In 
practice though, by limiting the importance of age-based rules and 
the level of cadre turnover, Xi risks accelerating the aging of the par-
ty-state elite. Institutional springboards for fast promotion are de-
creasing in importance. That is true not only of open selection, as we 
have seen, but also of the Communist League Youth League. This 
body used to play a critical role as a fast-track pathway towards leader-
ship positions, but has seen its importance weakened in recent years – 
especially at the central level (Doyon forthcoming). These changes 
will not prevent young officials from being promoted to high-level 
positions anymore, but rather will likely make their occurrence rarer. 
In the absence of formalised paths, and of objective criteria, promo-
tion will increasingly be based on clientelist relationships with incum-
bent leaders going forwards. The effects of these changes started to 
become visible with the current CC selected during the 19th Party 
Congress, which is the oldest in decades – with an average age of 57, 
compared to 56.1 in 2012 and 53.5 in 2007 (South China Morning Post 
2017). 
&RQFOXVLRQ
Xi Jinping’s concentration of power in his own hands goes together 
with increased power for local Party leaders too. Xi puts pressure on 
leading officials through disciplinary campaigns, but at the same time 
Party leaders at every level now have greater discretion over recruit-
ment and promotion. Rather than pure centralisation, this appears to 
be a tendency towards concentrating power in the hands of Party 
leaders at every level. The “decentralised authoritarian” configuration 
described by Landry (2008), which combines high levels of local au-
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tonomy with a strong Party hierarchy, is therefore being deepened 
under Xi rather than challenged.  
Against the political ideals of the Deng Xiaoping era – albeit 
never really implemented – of a separation between Party and state 
and the collective leadership of the former, Xi emphasises instead the 
concentration of power and democratic centralism (Pei 2019). At the 
institutional level, as has been shown in detail, the Party’s control 
over personnel management and disciplining is increasing. These 
changes run counter to a more efficient anti-corruption drive involv-
ing external scrutiny. When it comes to the officials themselves, Xi is 
dismantling evaluation and recruitment mechanisms developed in the 
first decade of the new century. New regulations regarding personnel 
management make evaluation criteria less transparent by emphasising 
political standards instead. Procedures aiming at greater intra-Party 
democracy are also under attack. While these procedures far from 
guaranteed full transparency, they imposed certain limits on the Party 
secretary’s power over cadre selection and also facilitated elite turn-
over.  
Xi is strengthening, then, the clientelist features of the party 
state. The subjectivity of the Party secretary is increasingly at the cen-
tre of the picture. Referring to the end of the Mao Zedong era, Wal-
der (1986) captured this form of institutionalised clientelism with the 
expression “principled particularism.” It creates a “clientelist system 
in which public loyalty to the party and its ideology is mingled with 
personal loyalties between party branch officials and their clients” 
(Walder 1986: 124). He argues that these clientelist ties replace the 
impersonal standards of behaviour dictated by the party state’s ideol-
ogy and policies, upon which individuals are supposed to be evaluat-
ed. At every level of the organisational structure, the supervisor de-
termines who they think shows adherence to the regime’s ideology 
through their behaviour. They reward, therefore, those individuals 
who – according to them – display appropriate commitment. Clien-
telism is institutionalised as specific rewards for compliance, and 
displays of loyalty are instituted as organisational principles. Prin-
cipled particularism is very much alive and well under Xi. 
These organisational changes strengthen Xi’s grip on power, and 
favour his own generation of officials. Following the same logic as 
the constitutional amendment which removes the two-term limit for 
the president, the changes discussed here are good examples of what 
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Slater (2003) calls “rigging”: the modification of institutional rules to 
limit competition for leadership positions. By limiting formal avenues 
for rapid promotion and challenging the age-based promotion rules, 
Xi is reducing competition for his generation of officials now in power. 
He is, however, moving away from the rejuvenation mechanisms of 
the Deng era, which helped facilitate elite turnover and contributed to 
the Party’s longevity (Nathan 2003; Landry 2008). This strategy may 
prove costly in the long run, as it could become increasingly difficult 
for the party state to attract the best young candidates – leaving an 
aging organisation standing. 
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